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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v.
DION L. BARNARD,
                                      Appellant.
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(Crim. Action No. 06-73-GMS)
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 27, 2009
Before:   RENDELL, AMBRO and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 30, 2009)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Dion Barnard challenges the District Court’s Order denying his motion to dismiss
the indictment against him.  On appeal, he argues, as he argued before the District Court,
The government asked Barnard to stipulate to the fingerprint exemplar’s1
authenticity, but Barnard declined. 
Henderson was identified as the user who entered Barnard’s fingerprints into the2
system.  But, because the office was having difficulties accessing certain accounts at that
time (and, as a result, some marshals had to log in under others’ user names), the
government could not rely on computer records for authentication.  Furthermore,
Henderson could not recall processing Barnard. 
2
that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits his re-trial.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.
I. Background
Because we write for the parties, who are familiar with the factual background of
this matter, we recount only those facts that are relevant to our disposition.  
On June 27, 2006, the Grand Jury for the District of Delaware indicted Barnard on
one count of distribution of fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A).  His trial commenced on May 12, 2008.  During its case-in-chief,
the government called as a witness a confidential informant who testified that he had
arranged for and completed a controlled drug buy from Barnard. 
In order to link Barnard to the package of cocaine base that he allegedly sold to the
informant, the government intended to show that the fingerprints on the package matched
those on an FBI fingerprint card bearing Barnard’s name.   To authenticate the card, the1
government called U.S. Deputy Marshall Robert Henderson.   He testified that when a2
person’s fingerprints are taken, the system searches the FBI database for a match, and, if
there is a match, the system retrieves the person’s information.  He also testified that
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 3
We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651 (1977) (orders rejecting claims of “former jeopardy” constitute final decisions under
§ 1291).  
3
Barnard’s information was in the system at the time of his arrest and that, accordingly, he
had an FBI record number.  Although the government apparently had told Barnard that it
planned to authenticate the fingerprint card in this fashion, Barnard immediately moved
for a mistrial, arguing that the jury would infer from Henderson’s testimony that Barnard
had a criminal record.  The Court granted his motion “out of an abundance of caution.” 
On June 9, 2008, Barnard moved to dismiss the indictment against him, contending
that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the government from retrying him.  The District
Court denied his motion on July 10, 2008, and this timely appeal followed. 
II. Discussion3
“We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s resolution of constitutional
issues, including legal questions concerning Double Jeopardy challenges.”  United States
v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  However, we review the
Court’s factual findings for clear error.  E.g., United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336
(3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  
When a defendant has “succeeded in aborting [a trial] on his own motion,” the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars re-trial
“[o]nly where the governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant
The subjective intent of the prosecutor is a factual question and is thus subject to4
clear error review.  United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769, 776-77 (3d Cir. 1982).
4
into moving for a mistrial.”  Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982).  It is the
defendant’s burden to prove such intent.  See United States v. Williams, 472 F.3d 81, 85-
86 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A]pplication of the double jeopardy bar is dependent on a showing of
the prosecutor’s subjective intent to cause a mistrial in order to retry the case.”); United
States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1173 (9th Cir. 2006) (“For the Double Jeopardy Clause
to bar retrial, Defendants must demonstrate [intentional provocation by the prosecutor].”)
(citing Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676).  According to the District Court, Barnard did not
establish that the prosecutor intended to subvert the protections against double jeopardy. 
Barnard contests that finding, but, because it is not clearly erroneous, his challenge must
fail.  4
In United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1982), we articulated a number of
issues for courts to consider in assessing whether a prosecutor intentionally provoked a
motion for a mistrial.  They are: (1) whether the record contains any indication that the
prosecutor believed the defendant would be acquitted; (2) whether a second trial would be
desirable for the government; and (3) whether the prosecutor justified his remarks to the
trial court.  Id. at 777-78.  The District Court determined that none of those factors
supported a finding of intentional provocation.  We agree with each of the Court’s
conclusions.  
5Barnard argues that the prosecutor had reason to expect an acquittal based on the
questionable credibility of its confidential informant – a convicted drug dealer awaiting
sentence, who stood to benefit from assisting the government.  But his claim is undercut
by the fact that the prosecutor chose to call the witness with full knowledge of the
potential for impeachment. It was the prosecutor who elicited from the witness his
criminal record and his cooperation with the government, and Barnard’s cross-
examination produced no startling revelations that further compromised the witness’s
credibility.  Moreover, the government expected to present fingerprint evidence that
would link Barnard to a package of cocaine base, thus corroborating the informant’s
account of what transpired.  Barnard has identified the informant’s flaws, but he has not
demonstrated how the informant was a detriment to the government’s case, and he has not
established that the prosecutor had reason to believe that the jury would acquit.
Barnard also contends that the mistrial was advantageous to the government
because it afforded the government the opportunity to locate the agent who actually took
Barnard’s fingerprints.  However, Barnard fails to recognize that the government had a
plan for authenticating the fingerprints at trial – one that Barnard knew about and did not
object to until Deputy Marshall Henderson revealed that Barnard had an FBI number.  It
would make no sense for the prosecutor, who evidently believed that she had a legitimate
way to authenticate the prints, to force a mistrial in order to find a different means of
6authentication.  Thus, Barnard’s contention does not support a finding of intentional
provocation.  
Finally, Barnard claims that the government never offered a plausible justification
for the actions that led to the mistrial.  The prosecutor explained, both at trial and in its
brief in response to Barnard’s motion for dismissal, that she presented testimony
regarding Barnard’s FBI number because Barnard would not stipulate to the fingerprint
exemplar’s authenticity and she could not determine which agent had actually taken the
fingerprints.  According to Barnard, that explanation is implausible because, instead of
putting Henderson on the stand, the government could have called another witness to
authenticate the fingerprint card.  Barnard does not explain who this other witness might
be or how the witness would have authenticated the card without mentioning the fact that
Barnard’s information was in the FBI database at the time of his arrest.  A vague
suggestion that the government might have had other options for authenticating the
fingerprint card does not establish that the government’s justification was implausible.  
At the root of Barnard’s appeal is his sense that the prosecutor was overzealous in
her attempt to authenticate the fingerprint exemplar, so overzealous that, in establishing
its authenticity, she solicited testimony from which the jury could infer that Barnard had a
criminal record.  However, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that
prosecutorial overreaching, absent a specific intent to provoke a mistrial, violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause.  Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 674-75.  The remedy for such
7overreaching is a mistrial, not dismissal of the indictment against the defendant. 
Assuming there was overreaching here – an issue that is not before us – a mistrial is
precisely the relief that Barnard got, and he is entitled to nothing more.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s Order denying
Barnard’s motion to dismiss the indictment against him.      
